For a while now, when people ask me how they can improve their websites’ security, I tell them: Start by turning on HTTPS for everything. Run a separate server on port 80 that issues nothing but permanent redirects to the
https:// version of the same URL. There’s lots more you can do, but that’s the easy first step. There are a number of common objections to this plan; today I want to talk about the
it should be the user’s choice objection, expressed for instance in
Google to Gmail customers: You WILL use HTTPS by Robert L. Mitchell. It goes something like this:
Why should I (the operator of the website) assume I know better than each of my users what their security posture should be? Maybe this is a
throwaway account, of no great importance to them. Maybe they are on a slow link that is intrinsically hard to eavesdrop upon, so the extra network round-trips involved in setting up a secure channel make the site annoyingly slow for no benefit.
This objection ignores the
public health benefits of secure channels. I’d like to make an analogy to immunization, here. If you get vaccinated against the measles (for instance), that’s good for you because you are much less likely to get the disease yourself. But it is also good for everyone who lives near you, because now you can’t infect them either. If enough people in a region are immune, then nobody will get the disease, even if they aren’t immune; this is called herd immunity. Secure channels have similar benefits to the general public—unconditionally securing a website improves security for everyone on the ’net, whether or not they use that website! Here’s why.
Most of the criminals who
crack websites don’t care which accounts they gain access to. This surprises people; if you ask users, they often say things like
well, nobody would bother breaking into my email / bank account / personal computer, because I’m not a celebrity and I don’t have any money! But the attackers don’t care about that. They break into email accounts so they can send spam; any
@gmail.com address is as good as any other. They break into bank accounts so they can commit credit card fraud; any given person’s card is probably only good for US$1000 or so, but multiply that by thousands of cards and you’re talking about real money. They break into PCs so they can run botnets; they don’t care about data stored on the computer, they want the CPU and the network connection. For more on this point, see the paper
Folk Models of Home Computer Security by Rick Wash. This is the most important reason why security needs to be unconditional. Accounts may be
throwaway to their users, but they are all the same to the attackers.
Often, criminals who
crack websites don’t care which websites they gain access to, either. The logic is similar: the legitimate contents of the website are irrelevant. All the attacker wants is to reuse a legitimate site as part of a spamming scheme or to copy the user list, guess the weaker passwords, and try those username+password combinations on
more important websites. This is why everyone who has a website, even if it’s tiny and attracts hardly any traffic, needs to worry about its security. This is also why making websites secure improves security for everyone, even if they never intentionally visit that website.
Now, how does HTTPS help with all this? The easiest several ways to break into websites involve snooping on unsecured network traffic to steal user credentials. This is possible even with the common-but-insufficient tactic of sending only the login form over HTTPS, because every insecure HTTP request after login includes a piece of data called a
session cookie that can be stolen and used to impersonate the user for most purposes without having to know the user’s password. (It’s often not possible to change the user’s password without also knowing the old password, but that’s about it. If an attacker just wants to send spam, and doesn’t care about maintaining control of the account, a session cookie is good enough.) It’s also possible even if all logged-in users are served only HTTPS, but you get an unsecured page until you login, because then an attacker can modify the unsecured page and make it steal credentials. Only applying channel security to the entire site for everyone, whoever they are, logged in or not, makes this class of attacks go away.
Unconditional use of HTTPS also enables further security improvements. For instance, a site that is exclusively HTTPS can use the Strict-Transport-Security mechanism to put browsers on notice that they should never communicate with it over an insecure channel: this is important because there are turnkey
SSL stripping tools that lurk in between a legitimate site and a targeted user and make it look like the site wasn’t HTTPS in the first place. There are subtle differences in the browser’s presentation that a clever human might notice—or you could direct the computer to pay attention, and then it will notice. But this only works, again, if the site is always HTTPS for everyone. Similarly, an always-secured site can mark all of its cookies
httponly which cuts off more ways for attackers to steal user credentials. And if a site runs complicated code on the server, exposing that code to the public Internet two different ways (HTTP and HTTPS) enlarges the server’s attack surface. If the only thing on port 80 is a boilerplate
try again with HTTPS permanent redirect, this is not an issue. (Bonus points for invalidating session cookies and passwords that just went over the wire in cleartext.)
Finally, I’ll mention that if a site’s users can turn security off, then there’s a per-user toggle switch in the site’s memory banks somewhere, and the site operators can flip that switch off if they want. Or if they have been, shall we say, leaned on. It’s a lot easier for the site operators to stand up to being leaned on if they can say
that’s not a thing our code can do.